International accounting regulation by the United Nations: a power perspective

Abstract

This paper presents the results of a complex but challenging investigation into the global power play at the United Nations (UN) over the issue of international accounting regulation. It specifically attempts to explain why the host developing nations of most transnational corporations (TNCs), despite controlling a significant majority vote at the UN and thus possessing the necessary “political” power, conspicuously failed to impose their accounting disclosure agenda on the TNCs and on the (minority) developed nations. The political concept of power is used in examining the accounting standard setting process at the UN, in the context of regulatory reforms of the TNCs. While alternative models of power are considered, Robert Dahl’s decision‐oriented pluralistic model was adopted in the study because it proved to be the most consistent with the events, objectives and the empirical data presented. The research findings indicate that organized pressures from the TNCs, co‐ordinated under the joint forum of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the International Organisation of Employers (IOE), coupled with the economic and diplomatic manoeuvring of the developed market economy nations, had succeeded in overriding the rule of “one‐nation‐one‐vote” and securing ade factoveto over the majority view at the UN. The pioneering efforts of the UN in setting international reporting standards had been curbed and frustrated through the construction and use of such “veto” by the minority representation.