Internal versus External Representation

Abstract

I argue there are two kinds of representatwo fundamentally different aspects or categories tion, whose joint recognition promises, among of representation-each of which is generically other things, to provide relatively clear and describable as by picture of unified account of both pictorial representation some thing X. We confuse these two fundaand fictional reference. mentally different aspects at our peril. Thus the To begin, I shall show by demonstrating an label ambiguous will remain descriptively apparent ambiguity in the concept of represenconvenient for such phrases as P is representation it has two distinct aspects. One standtation of and thus derivatively as applied ard test for ambiguity of concept C is to find to the concept of representation itself, even if it case in which C both is and is not applicable to is only (very) different kinds of use, or different some object or objects; then one may proceed to aspects, of concept are actually repair the damage by distinguishing different involved. senses, aspects, or varieties of the concept C. As for the evidence I have used to establish Here is pictorial test case of this kind for the the ambiguity in question, it is arguably not concept of representation. controversial at all, since it is recognized First, it is surely true picture might already. For example: Richard Wollheim distinrepresent man, even if there is no actual guishes representations of particular objects, or about whom it is true he is the thus events, from representations of objects or events represented by picture P. For the person who that are merely of particular kind, and thus painted A might have intended merely to repreof man, and so on, rather than of some particusent a without having any particular lar man;1 whereas Kendall Walton uses the actual in mind. fact picture can man, even However, if there is no actual represented though there is no actual thus represented, by picture P, then there is clear sense in which as part of his case the concept of represenP does not a man-at least not in the tation is primarily to be understood not in sense in which it would a man if object-centered ways, but rather in terms of his there were some actual whom it represented. own props used in imaginative games At the same time, though, to repeat, clearly approach.2 Nelson Goodman, in the face of such picture might still a man in the examples, distinguishes picture of from first sense above, in that, if the artist's painting man-picture, in cases where no actual is is successful, then it will represent in represented.3 spite of the fact it does not a However, by focusing on the fact man in the sense of an actual man. examples such as the above show there is Now to be sure, the ambiguity here might be an apparent, or at least formal, ambiguity in the argued to be located primarily in the whole concept of representation, I hope to facilitate the phrase of or in different raising of issues and approaches have not senses of a man in each case, rather than in yet been adequately investigated. the concept of representation itself. Nevertheless, First, I shall distinguish the relevant distinct the case at least shows the need to distinguish concepts or aspects of representation as external