Internal Security in Wartime Japan (1937-45) and the Creation of Internal Insecurity

Abstract

The wartime period in Japan has been called the "Dark Valley." It is an apt description. The wartime was one of the most tragic periods in Japanese history and it remains shrouded in mystery because of the difficulty in conducting research on it. A lot of documents and correspondence which might have revealed much about conditions at the time were destroyed during the course of war. Scholars have nevertheless demonstrated that fears of a growing Communist threat were pervasive among Japan’s wartime elite of social, political and financial notables and that these fears did inspire some key figures to launch a movement to terminate the war in order to avert a possible revolution. This paper contributes to studies of the wartime "Red Scare" by examining how the internal security system itself contributed to such anxieties. It is apparent that the system was plagued by serious problems and was unable to withstand the pressures for greater vigilance caused by the war. The wartime expansion of personnel and organizations, which resulted in greater competition among organizations and the induction of less competent officers, made the internal security system even more unwieldy than it had been to start with. Efforts, moreover, against subversives did not contribute to a greater sense of internal security but proved to be seriously counterproductive. Internal security organizations such as the civil police, who were so determined to eliminate any antiwar and antigovernment movements, intentionally or unintentionally invented conspiracies and ultimately helped to promote an argument to end the war. In the end, those who advocated peace and an end to military rule, pointing to the supposedly large number of Communists who were successfully turning the people against the government, could argue that the war was hurtling the nation toward revolution.