Abstract
In the theoretical framework of corporate governance, this article studies the efficiency of the control exerted by the ownership structure and the board of directors on managers for the purpose of privileging investment in R&D. This efficiency is sensitive to national systems of governance. Tests realized on a sample of 531 U.S., Japanese and French firms with the canonical method corroborate the existence of positive relationships between concentration of ownership, the internal administrator dominance and the non-dual structure on the one hand, and the investment in R&D, on the other.
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