Abstract
This study has the objective of examining how internal corporate governance mechanisms are related to earnings manipulation, measured by real-based earnings manipulation (REM) and accrual-based earnings manipulation (AEM). The internal corporate governance mechanisms discussed in this study signify two main kinds of board characteristics (board size and board independence) and three main kinds of ownership structure (institutional ownership, foreign ownership and business group affiliation). The study models were examined from eight countries selected from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. A total of 480 non-financial firms listed between 2012 and 2019 were examined. Based on panel data-based generalised methods of moments (GMM) estimation, the findings showed that institutional ownership in MENA nations limits the use of REM and AEM. Additionally, we found that larger boards are more likely to participate in REM practices. Board independence has a positive association with REM and AEM. The results also reveal that business group affiliation has a significant effect on both methods of earnings manipulation. Foreign ownership does not seem to significantly impact either of the two manipulation methods. Finally, these results help regulators and policymakers pursue reforms to enhance national governance quality in the MENA region.
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