Abstract
Abstract In this chapter I consider a second factor that contributes to the answers we give to philosophical questions: our adoption of certain intermediate-level philosophical principles. These principles have more content than the metaphilosophies, but they are more general than the answers to lower-level questions such as whether free will or moral truth exists. Intermediate principles contribute to, without absolutely dictating, the answers we give to lower-level philosophical questions. While metaphilosophies reflect our overall vision of philosophy, in terms of both our beliefs about philosophy and our desires-for-philosophy, intermediate principles provide the largely unargued-for premises that bridge the gap between metaphilosophies and our answers to philosophical questions. Differences in intermediate principles also account for the differences in substantive views between practitioners with the same metaphilosophical motivation.
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