Intermediate Appellate Courts and the Doctrine of Precedent: Lendlease Corporation Ltd v Pallas

Abstract

The High Court of Australia appeal in Lendlease Corporation Ltd v Pallas raises a novel question of precedent: what approach should an intermediate appellate court (‘IAC’) take when faced with competing IAC authorities? The cases reveal that different approaches have been adopted: deferring to the home jurisdiction, favouring the most recent decision, and approaching the issue afresh. The principled answer to this question must be informed by the modern concept of a single Australian common law and the corollary rule that an IAC should not depart from a decision of another IAC on an issue of national operation unless convinced that the earlier decision is ‘plainly wrong’. It is argued that if Court B has found a decision of Court A to be plainly wrong, should the issue come before Court A again for determination, it is not open for Court A to defer to its previous decision or consider the matter afresh. In an integrated judicial system of equals working together to achieve a common goal, consistency demands that Court A give heightened deference to the decision of Court B.