Intergroup cooperation prevents resource exhaustion but undermines intra-group cooperation in the common-pool resource experiment

Karolina Safarzynska

doi:10.5751/es-09681-220410

Abstract

Intergroup cooperation prevents resource exhaustion but undermines intra-group cooperation in the common-pool resource experiment

Highlights

It is urgently necessary to prevent degradation of the environment
Can intergroup cooperation over resources help prevent resource exhaustion and mitigate effects of climate change? How does resource uncertainty affect inter- and intra- group cooperation over resources in the common-pool resource dilemmas? I present experimental evidence from a mixed design experiment with two-between-groups factors: (1) the availability of intergroup sharing in which subjects can decide whether to give up some of their harvests to augment the resource stock of another group; (2) the presence of shocks that can destroy a part of resources; and with one within-groups factor (41 replications)
The results suggest that intergroup sharing undermines the positive impact of shocks on resource conservation

Summary

Introduction

It is urgently necessary to prevent degradation of the environment. Results from field studies have shown that many communities self-organize and design effective institutions so as to prevent resource exhaustion (Ostrom 1992, 2006, Sigmund et al 2010, Janssen et al 2011). Studies of common-pool resource dilemmas (CPR) analyze harvesting decisions within groups in repeated games, in the absence of any spillover between groups. This is surprising, as 85% of Africa’s water resources are composed of large river basins that are shared between several countries (Ashton 2002). It is increasingly recognized that sustainability challenges require cooperation dilemmas to be addressed at multiple levels, for instance between individuals, groups, and populations (Waring et al 2015)

Methods

Results

Conclusion