Abstract

In this paper the design of intergovernmental transfer schemes in a federation is analysed, focusing on schemes that can have a significant impact on improving interpersonal distribution in the sense of alleviating poverty. It is argued that states with a lower income have larger concentrations of poor persons and that their ability to combat poverty is lower and their opportunity cost higher. Federal transfers are not only a cost-effective means of enabling such states to undertake nationally optimal levels of poverty alleviation but also a way of ensuring that they actually do so. The distribution of intergovernmental transfers in India during the seventh five-year plan is examined, and it is argued that general-purpose and specific-purpose transfers were inadequate and imperfectly designed from the perspective of poverty alleviation.

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