Interests, Institutions, and the Environment: An Examination of Fisheries Subsidies

Abstract

Abstract Protecting the environment has emerged as one of the major challenges in international relations. In international environmental negotiations, countries hold divergent positions because of domestic politics and specifically the interaction of interests and institutions. Domestic political institutions privilege the interests of some groups over others, depending on their geographic distribution. This observation matters for global environmental cooperation because groups with varied interests in protecting the environment often exhibit different geographic patterns, as illustrated in negotiations over fisheries subsidies at the World Trade Organization (WTO). The fishing industry tends to be concentrated in geographic space because of its reliance on a geographically specific natural resource. The industry’s geographic concentration gives it relatively more political clout in countries with plurality electoral systems. Environmentalists, who tend to be more diffuse geographically, enjoy greater political influence in countries with proportional representation systems and party-centered electoral competition. These political dynamics, as well as the electoral success of Green political parties, influence governments’ spending priorities as well as states’ positions in international environmental negotiations.