Interests, ideologies, and great power spheres of influence

Abstract

Militarily aggressive actions by Russia and China in recent years have sparked a debate among foreign policy commentators regarding the utility of spheres of influence, even as International Relations (IR) scholars have continued to neglect the phenomenon. This article tests three rival theories that attempt to explain the spheres of influence behavior of great powers. Structural realism proposes that a great power will cede a small power to the sphere of a rival that possesses a stronger material interest in the small power and is a peer competitor, and that a consequent rupture or crisis in the sphere will lead the great power to engage in vigorous but restricted cooperation with the restive small power that maintains the previously granted sphere. Ideological distance theory (IDT) hypothesizes that a great power will steadfastly oppose ceding an ideologically homogeneous small power to the sphere of an ideologically divergent peer competitor, and that a rupture in a previously granted sphere will result in noncooperation between the great power grantor and restive small power if they are ideologically heterogeneous. I introduce a third approach, modified ideological distance theory (MIDT), which predicts that a great power will temporarily oppose ceding an ideologically homogeneous small power to the sphere of an ideologically divergent peer competitor, and will engage in delayed and attenuated cooperation with an ideologically heterogeneous small power following a rupture in a peer competitor’s sphere. Examination of the United States’ relationship with Yugoslavia (1948–1955) and the Soviet Union’s relationship with Cuba (1960–1962) demonstrates MIDT’s explanatory superiority.