Interests and Political Institutions in U.S. Long-Distance Telecommunications Policy

Abstract

This study analyzes the “adjudicative rule-making decisions” made by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regarding the long-term dominant carrier, AT&T, in the U.S. long-distance service market over the period of 1965–1995. With the goal of identifying the determinants of FCC’s telecommunications policy decisions that were made in favor of AT&T over other common carriers or public interest groups, this study seeks to test regulation theories regarding interest group power and the roles of political institutions. A logistic regression model characterizing the conditions under which the FCC actually adopted policy decisions in favor of or against AT&T’s interests was developed to understand the response of the FCC and assess the relative effects of interest groups and political institutions on the FCC’s 699 decision cases. The logit analysis shows that FCC policy making is significantly influenced by simultaneous modes of interest group power, coming from AT&T, other common carriers, and other public interest groups, and the roles of political institutions, including the federal agency itself, Congress, Presidents, and the courts.