Interest subvention for crop loans in India: Win-win or win-lose ?

Abstract

Interest subsidies on crop loans are a common feature of rural credit markets in developing countries. The objective behind giving interest subsidies is two-fold – increasing access to credit and improving loan repayment rates, and is therefore regarded as a win-win for the borrower and the lender. This study focusses on a policy intervention that provides interest subsidy for crop loans availed under the Kisan Credit Card (KCC) scheme - India's flagship program to provide short-term agricultural credit for farmers. Using a unique dataset from a large public sector bank in India, we evaluate the causal impact of this intervention on both credit access and loan repayment behavior. We also capture the heterogeneous impact of the policy on new and existing borrowers. The results of econometric analysis - a combination of matching and difference-in-difference techniques - show a substantial increase (35%) in new loans, in addition to 20% decrease in the overall loan amount, indicating increased breadth and depth of access. However, contrary to standard economic theories, we observe a reduction in odds of repayment. Further, we find that the interest rate subsidy worsens the repayment rates of existing borrowers too. Our findings underscore the importance of various operational and behavioral aspects of the agricultural lending ecosystem to design win-win credit policies.