Abstract

The primary objective of this paper is to study the post Dodd-Frank network structure of the interest rate swap market and propose a set of effective complexity measures to understand how the swap users respond to market risks. We use a unique swap dataset extracted from the swap data repositories (SDRs) to examine the network structure properties and market participants’ risk management behaviors. We find (a) the interest rate swap market follows a scale-free network where the power-law exponent is less than 2, which indicates that few of its important entities have a significant number of contracts within their subsidiaries (a.k.a. interaffiliated swap contracts); (b) swap rate volatility Granger-causes swap users to increase their risk sharing intensity at entity level, but market participants do not change their risk management strategies in general; (c) there is a significant contemporaneous correlation between the swap rate volatility and the underlying interest rate futures volatility. However, interest rate swap volatility does not cause the underlying interest rate futures volatility and vice versa. These findings provide the market regulators and swap users a better understanding of interest rate swap market participants’ risk management behaviors, and it also provides a method to monitor the swap market risk sharing dynamics.

Highlights

  • Introduction and BackgroundSince the 2008-09 financial crisis, there are multitudes of new policies being proposed and successfully implemented to improve resiliency of the financial system in response to extreme events

  • This paper examines network structure of the post DoddFrank interest rate swap market and aims to bring better understanding of how the swap users respond to the interest rate risks

  • Utilizing a unique swap data repositories (SDRs) dataset collected pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, we propose two weighted network complexity measures to capture the dynamic nature of the counterparty exposures of the interest rate swap market, characterized by “too big to fail” and “too interconnected to fail” institutions

Read more

Summary

Introduction

Introduction and BackgroundSince the 2008-09 financial crisis, there are multitudes of new policies being proposed and successfully implemented to improve resiliency of the financial system in response to extreme events. A few examples of the financial reforms that have changed the topology of the financial system, and especially the swaps market, were requirements following the Dodd-Frank Act, namely real-time reporting of swap transactions, clearing mandate applicable to certain, swaps and the made available to trade (MAT) mandate which required certain swaps to be traded on Swap Execution Facilities (SEFs). While all these changes were done in the hopes of preventing another financial crisis, they have definitely changed how swaps are traded and how information about swaps are disseminated in the market. A key question now is how is the swaps market shaped after all the structural changes?

Objectives
Methods
Results
Conclusion
Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call