Interest-Network Structures in Exchange Networks

Abstract

Studies of power in exchange networks have concentrated overwhelmingly on how the power distribution in the network is affected by the network structure. In this article I look at how one type of interest-network structure—the distribution of interest coincidence among network members—affects the power distribution in exchange networks. All exclusionary networks—networks in which power differences stem from differential ability to exclude exchange partners from exchange—have assumed an interest-network structure of homogeneous interests among network members. All connected actors have opposing interests within exchange; when one partner does better the other does worse. Here I allow connected pairs of actors to vary in the degree to which their interests are opposing or coincident. This creates the possibility of a wide variety of structures of interest coincidence in exchange networks. Using two different methods—an analytic method derived from power-dependence principles and a modification of a widely used computer program simulating exchange in networks—I show that, given the assumptions embodied in those methods, the interest-network structure of interest coincidence can have substantial effects on the power rankings of network members.