Abstract
This paper analyses the Interest Group approach to political choice, an approach that has recently been adopted by economists. The paper argues that Interest Group theorists have overlooked, and sometimes denied, the potential of their approach to distinguish between optimal and non‐optimal (or ‘inefficient’) policy outcomes. The analysis is illustrated with examples from banking regulation.
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