Interest group PAC contributions and the 1992 regulation of cable television

Abstract

The literature concerning political action committee (PAC) influence over congressional roll-call decisions offers mixed findings. Some studies find strong effects, others weak effects, while some detect no PAC impact on congressional roll-call voting. These mixed results imply that PAC influence might vary across contexts and perhaps interact with other variables. In this paper, we suggest that PAC influence might vary with two contexts. First, we hypothesize that PAC influence will vary with chamber, and in particular, PAC effects will be stronger in the House than in the Senate. Second, we hypothesize that PAC effects will be stronger in policy subsystems than at the macropolitical level. We test these hypotheses with the votes on the 1992 Cable Television Reregulation Act. The fact that both chambers twice voted upon identically worded bills, once for passage, once to override President Bush’s veto, allows us to construct a quasi-experimental design. Results of the analysis generally support our hypotheses. We conclude with some suggestions for future research on the linkage between interest groups, PAC contributions, and congressional policy making.