Abstract
How does the intensity of cooperating in lobbying coalitions affect the choice of lobbying strategies of interest groups? This question is analysed in this paper using data from 1117 Swiss and German interest organisations. We find, on the one hand, that the intensity of coalition building affects both directly targeting politicians (insider lobbying) but also indirect efforts of exerting influence via the media and citizens (outsider lobbying). In other words, the more intensely lobby groups cooperate, the more they make use of both insider and outsider lobbying tactics. However, we also find that the increase in these two types of lobbying efforts is not equal when cooperation intensifies. Due to the specific advantages of pooling expertise, insider lobbying benefits disproportionately when groups work more closely together.
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