Abstract
Interdistrict school choice programs—where a student can be assigned to a school outside of her district—are widespread in the US. We introduce a model of interdistrict school choice and present mechanisms that produce stable assignments. We consider four categories of policy goals on assignments and identify when the mechanisms can achieve them. By introducing a novel framework of interdistrict school choice, we provide a new avenue of research in market design.
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