Abstract
A number of contemporary studies of executive-legislative relations have suggested that interbranch conflict owes primarily to transient institutional factors such as the relative level of organizational development within the executive or the rise of individual over collective interests within Congress (Aberbach 1990; Dodd 1977). In keeping with this interbranch conflict paradigm Holt (1995) and Smist (1990) conclude that conflict over the control and oversight of covert operations is a phenomenon of the Cold War era which should be seen as a modern manifestation of these same institutional factors (See Holt 1995, 2–3; Smist 1990, 4–19).
Published Version
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