Interbranch Competition Over Control of Federal Agencies and the Selection of Career Executives

Abstract

In this article, I explore how presidential administrations may use career civil service appointments, in contrast to political appointments, to compete with Congress over the control of federal agencies. Focusing on career members of the Senior Executive Service, I highlight the hiring of officials from outside the federal government or different agencies rather than promoting from within because outside candidates are more likely to be in stronger agreement with administration policy. By analyzing data on career SES hiring and legislative records, I find that administrations hire more officials without previous federal government experience when congressional competition over agency control is intense, as measured by the number of legislative directives in enacted bills that require or prohibit specific agency actions. I also find that more promotions from different agencies occur when congressional competition is intense relative to within-agency promotions. These findings suggest that administrations use career appointments to assert control over agencies against congressional competition, with implications for the political significance of policy professionals’ career mobility.