Interactive, Inclusive Substance Dualism

Abstract

This paper argues that a certain kind of substance dualism can adopt the ‘Compatibilist’ solution to the problem of causal exclusion. After sketching a non-Cartesian substance dualism akin to E.J. Lowe’s account (e.g. Lowe in Erkenntnis, 65(1), 5-23, 2006, 2008) and considering its shortcomings with respect to mental causation in section one, section two outlines an alternative account of mental causation and argues that this account solves the exclusion problem. Finally, section three considers a challenge to the proposed solution. With the exception of Lowe’s efforts (Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 70, 263–76, 1992, 2003, 2006, 2008), very little in defense of substance dualist mental causation is to be found in the recent philosophical literature.