Interaction Relationship between Agricultural Insurance and Transfer of Land Contract Rights Based on Game Analysis of Farmer Selection

Abstract

Abstract In the new stage of rural reform, faced universal transfer of land contract rights, one of the most important tasks of rural system construction is accelerating development of agricultural insurance in China. However, agricultural insurance does not function efficiently enough to accord effective protection to farmers in land contract rights transfer, and agricultural insurance and transfer of land contract rights become a dual dilemma. To address this difficulty, agricultural insurance is premised to improve the implementation of land contract rights transfer, in which appropriate safeguards are acquired. Thus, the introduction of game theory is necessary and feasible for analyzing the strategy by which farmers select agricultural insurance and land contracts. Based on game analysis, the “players” are the agricultural insurance and land contracts encountered by farmers; “strategy” is composed of agricultural insurance and land contract selection behaviors. Farmer behavior can achieve equilibrium of anticipated profits. Equilibrium then yields the “outcome,” which is the cooperation and win-win solutions that may be achieved between agricultural insurance and transfer of land contract rights. Thus, in the rational selection process of farmers, agricultural insurance and transfer of land contract rights can facilitate positive support, interaction, and development. These will help realize overall progress in system innovation with respect to agricultural insurance.