Abstract
We study the power distribution in the ordinary legislative procedure of the European Union using van den Brink and Steffen's positional power measure for sequential voting procedures. We show that the Lisbon Treaty failed to equalize the powers of the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers, and left the European Commission the most powerful of the three institutions due to its agenda-setting prerogative.
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