Abstract
This article analyzes the growing interbranch conflicts inherent to the design of US trade policymaking and the search for a balance of power between the legislative and the executive branches amidst recurrent debates on the merits of globalization. To do so, it traces the origins of these institutional battles and maps out these conflicts across different instruments of the trade policy apparatus. Additionally, it explores the drivers of executive-legislative contention and assesses its complex relations with partisan polarization. The conclusions are two-fold. First, since 1974, under the dual imperative of economic leadership and democratic governance, trade institutions have undergone a bifurcated development where both trade-liberalizing and protective measures developed in both executive and legislative branches. The 1974 Trade Act has played a structuring role in the bicephalous transformation of US trade policymaking, heralding a long legacy of interbranch conflicts amidst stormy debates over globalization and the role that the United States should play in the world economy. Second, in a context of hyperpolarization, institutional mechanisms and legislative reforms can only go so far as to preserve a balance of power necessary to address the tensions between democratic governance and international competitiveness. Beyond the US case, this means that efforts to curtail protectionism cannot be confined to policy recommendations and technocratic solutions, but must address the political and ideological roots of the current globalization fatigue.
Highlights
Executive empowerment in trade policymaking took four forms1) the broadening of negotiating powers; 2) increased discretion over protective measures; 3) a progressive build-up in institutional capacities; 4) new limitations on congressional oversight
Les relations inter-branches dans l'élaboration de la politique commerciale américaine : équilibre des pouvoirs ou dérive autoritaire ?
42 Concerning FTA policy, Congress has made ample use of its statutory powers to provide input at every stage of the decision-making process, even though its influence remains strongest at the end of negotiations. When it comes to trade remedies, the legislative branch has been much more ambivalent to use its constitutional authority to restrain, let alone block executive action. This is largely due to the continued appeal of protectionism among US voters, especially the white working class of Rustbelt states, who continue to be a central constituency for the presidential election
Summary
1) the broadening of negotiating powers; 2) increased discretion over protective measures; 3) a progressive build-up in institutional capacities; 4) new limitations on congressional oversight. The other paradox of the 1974 TA is that while Congress gave the green light to the Executive branch to promote trade liberalization by tackling NTBs, it set the ground for new protectionist battles both by loosening eligibility for import relief and creating new trade defense instruments under the purview of the Executive branch. These institutional mechanisms epitomized the logic of shared powers in US trade policymaking. Only a few decades later, they would turn American trade policy into a constant struggle between the executive and the legislative branches, be it over the negotiation of trade agreements or the adoption of trade remedies
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