Intentional Objects, Existent and Nonexistent

Abstract

The concept of an intentional object is important for the whole project of this book. It has a central role in the account of existence and nonexistence. And merely intentional objects, which exist only in being represented, provide the clearest paradigm of things that are, but are not in themselves. Philosophical views about that sort of nonexistent objects are the main topic of this chapter. The view about nonexistent objects adopted in this book is a form of Moderate Realism. It affirms that there are fictitious and imaginary objects, but denies that they actually exist or have the main properties they are represented as having. Extreme Realism about nonexistent objects is represented here by Alexius Meinong (1853‒1920). He held that all possible objects of thought have their defining predicates whether or not they actually exist. That thesis is developed in a context that is ingenious and fascinating in a way, but in which the main arguments are knowingly never freed entirely from logical contradiction or at least the suspicion of it. At the opposite extreme, Anti-Realism, or Eliminationism, which denies that there are any objects that are nonexistent, is represented here by Kendall Walton’s monumental Mimesis as Make-Believe, in which assertions about nonexistent objects are analyzed as play-acting, taken as true inside the game, but recognized as false outside it. That surely happens; but does it really cover all belief in nonexistent intentional objects?