Intensity resolution and subjective magnitude in psychophysical scaling.

Abstract

Several successful theories of psychophysical judgment imply that exponents of power functions in scaling tasks should covary with measures of intensity resolution such as d' in the same tasks, whereas the prevailing metatheory of ideal psychophysical scaling asserts the independence of the two. In a direct test of this relationship, three prominent psychophysical scaling paradigms were studied: category judgment without an identification function, absolute magnitude estimation, and cross-modality matching with light intensity as the response continuum. Separate groups of subjects for each scaling paradigm made repeated judgments of the loudnesses of the pure tones that constituted each of two stimulus ensembles. The narrow- and wide-range ensembles shared six identical stimulus intensities in the middle of each set. Intensity resolution, as measured by d'-like distances, of these physically identical stimuli was significantly worse for the wide-range set for all three methods. Exponents of power functions fitted to geometric mean responses, and in magnitude estimation and cross-modality matching the geometric mean responses themselves, were also significantly smaller in the wide-range condition. The variation of power function exponents, and of psychophysical scale values, for stimulus intensities that were identical in the two stimulus sets with the intensities of other members of the ensembles is inconsistent with the metatheory on which modern psychophysical scaling practice is based, although it is consistent with other useful approaches to measurement of psychological magnitudes.