Abstract

In most West African countries, agricultural production is a complex process that involves multiple household members managing land and sharing agricultural inputs. We develop an intrahousehold decision-making model to illustrate how technology adoption can influence bargaining processes on farms in harsh agricultural environments of West Africa, where staple food production by extended families is organized collectively under the leadership of a senior head. The head, who assumes primary responsibility for household food security, also allocates fields to members who manage production individually. Drawing on this and the intrinsic complementarity of labor and fertilizer as divisible inputs, we test the nature of the linkage between fertilizer use on collective and individual plots by applying bivariate probit and tobit models to nationally-representative, panel data from Burkina Faso. We find evidence of input sharing, though bargaining is inadequate to sustain efficient allocation of fertilizer. Plot manager characteristics that influence bargaining power, such as literacy, gender, age, contact with extension, and membership in farmer organizations differ between collectively- and individually-managed plots—confirming the differential status of household members in technology adoption. Agroforestry practices are strongly and positively associated with fertilizer use, regardless of plot manage type. Programs aimed at increasing use of modern agricultural inputs should consider impacts on bargaining positions within the household. Providing inputs to women and young men will increase their influence on other decisions, which may lead to greater equity within the household. It may also enhance efficiency in production, since currently, inputs are not allocated efficiently within the household.

Highlights

  • Collective organization of farm production by extended family households is a social norm in the dryland farming systems of West Africa, including most regions of Burkina Faso

  • We extend the intrahousehold decision-making model proposed by Kazianga and Wahhaj (2013) to understand the allocation of a modern, divisible input between plots managed by the household head and those managed by other household members

  • We show how the intrinsic complementarity of fertilizer and labor inputs2 has implications for the bargaining positions of household members, and for policies and programs aimed at intensifying agriculture through fertilizer adoption in Burkina Faso

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Summary

Introduction

Collective organization of farm production by extended family households is a social norm in the dryland farming systems of West Africa, including most regions of Burkina Faso. In a higher rainfall region of Mali, Guirkinger, Platteau, and Goetghebuer (2015) concluded that plots managed by individuals had higher productivity than those managed collectively by heads, especially for cash crops. In none of these studies did authors explicitly examine linkages between input use on collective and individual fields. We develop a conceptual model that illustrates how technology adoption is affected by intrahousehold bargaining and enables us to test econometrically the nature of the linkage between input use on collective and individual fields.

The Burkinabe farming context
Theoretical model
Cooperative solution
Non-cooperative solution
Repeated interaction
Empirical strategy
Econometric approach
Variables
Descriptive statistics
Regression results
Conclusions
Full Text
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