Abstract
T. L. M. Pink, in his (1991) Purposive Intending, raises an important question about intentions, instructively criticizes a familiar response, and advances an interesting answer of his own. Pink's question is this (p. 343): What psychological attitudes rationalize and explain intentions to act? The burden of this note is to show that his answer is problematic. Pink forcefully attacks a thesis that he attributes to most recent theorists of practical reasoning and intention, including Anscombe, Davidson and Bratman (p. 344)-namely, the Identity thesis: [all] intentions to do are explained and rationalized by the same psychological attitudes which, given the belief that the intended time of action is now, would explain and rationalize doing A (p. 343). On Pink's alternative view,
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