Abstract
The adoption of intelligent construction technology (ICT) is regarded as one of the important strategies for the transformation and upgrading of the Chinese construction industry and the achievement of high-quality development. In the ICT adoption process, the government is the driving subject, the owner is an important subject, and ICT is applied in practice by the general contractor. This study first analyses the evolutionary process and the impact of participants' strategy choices on the system equilibrium by establishing a tripartite evolutionary game framework which includes the government, the owner, and the general contractor as the main stakeholders; then tests the feasibility and rationality of the model by analysing the ESS corresponding to the three phases of ICT adoption. The results show that the conditions for each ESS to be established mainly depend on the relationship between the costs and benefits of each stakeholder, and that owners are more sensitive to government subsidies and penalties than general contractors, so the government should establish a dynamic reward and punishment mechanism based on the results of the model. High adoption costs are a key barrier to ICT adoption for both owners and general contractors. This paper provides a new framework for research related to ICT adoption and a reference for the strategic adjustment of stakeholders in ICT adoption.
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