Intellectual Property Rights and Economical Development: A Brief Overview

Abstract

A "strong" IPRs regime, in the sense of providing robust protection of private intellectual property rights, was not a necessary prerequisite for their economic growth, according to the historical experiences of the now-developed nations while they were growing themselves, which we reviewed. Most of them did not provide PIPRs with any real protection until quite late in their development related to life science and especially biotechnology. Even the most developed nations, like the UK and the US, didn't create robust PIPRs regimes until the middle of the 19th century (with the exception of copyright protection in the US's instance), while the less developed nations didn't establish such regimes until much later. The legal framework governing the ownership and protection of intangible works of human intelligence, such as inventions, literary and creative creations, designs, symbols, names, and pictures used in commerce, is known as the Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) regime. This system consists of international agreements, rules, and laws that provide owners or inventors of intellectual property the exclusive right to profit from their creations or investments in them. For the purposes of this paper, it is more important to note that all of these nations were quite willing to v30isolate the intellectual property rights (IPRs) of other nations, even when they had put in place laws protecting the IPRs. Examples include hiring illegal foreign labor, smuggling machinery, industrial espionage, violating trademark laws, allowing the patenting of imported inventions, and outright refusing to adopt the patent system (in the case of the Netherlands and Switzerland) related to life science and especially biotechnology. Some nations approached this issue in ways that can only be described. The best examples include the routine infringement of British trademarks by German producers in the late 19th century, when the nation was pressuring Switzerland to enact a patent law, and the US pressing other nations for the "improvement" of their patent laws in the lead-up to the adoption of the Paris Convention while flatly refusing to protect foreign copyrights related to life science and especially biotechnology. We talked about the issues with the dominant IPR regime that is now in place, which is centered on the patent system, and the TRIPS agreement that represents its apex. Contrary to popular belief, a "good" IPRs regime need not provide the strongest protection for private IPRs. Next, we looked at whether developing nations would likely gain from a stronger PIPRs system, particularly the one required under the TRIPS. Given that most developing nations do minimal R&D and that much of the new information they produce is not patentable, the "domestic" advantages of a stronger IPRs system—that is, an increase in knowledge production by the citizens—are probably relatively minor related to life science.