Integrating Poor Taste into the Ongoing Debate on the Morality of Violent Video Games

Garry Young

doi:10.1007/s40869-017-0044-5

Abstract

This paper considers the implications of a recent change to the direction of our moral scrutiny of video game content: away from moral assessment based on some form of ‘contamination’ towards a position in which the morality of a video game is determined by the worldview (allegedly) endorsed by the gameplay taken as a whole. It is my contention that, given the nature of video game enactments (i.e., simulations involving make-believe), this switch of focus requires a degree of interpretation characteristic of judgements of poor taste. Because of this, with the exception of rare cases, the force of moral condemnation levelled at putatively immoral gameplays is weakened to the point where, typically, one would find it hard to justify a moral obligation not to permit the gameplay. In defence of this claim, I draw attention to the potential problems facing a moral account based on the interpretation of the worldview contained within a gameplay, even when taken as a whole.

Highlights

IntroductionIn a recent paper on the morality of video game violence, Michael Goerger (drawing from Coecklebergh 2007) introduces the contamination thesis as a means of capturing what he takes to be a common feature of several arguments countenancing the immorality of violent video games (Goerger 2017)
In a recent paper on the morality of video game violence, Michael Goerger introduces the contamination thesis as a means of capturing what he takes to be a common feature of several arguments countenancing the immorality of violent video games (Goerger 2017)
Where S declares ‘‘x is in poor taste’’, the reason x constitutes poor taste (Pt), at least for S—qua that which S considers to be in poor taste—is because it offends S

Summary

Introduction

In a recent paper on the morality of video game violence, Michael Goerger (drawing from Coecklebergh 2007) introduces the contamination thesis as a means of capturing what he takes to be a common feature of several arguments countenancing the immorality of violent video games (Goerger 2017). Not because I consider an examination of the worldviews espoused by video games to be the only worthwhile means of establishing their moral status and the only approach one should scrutinize, philosophically, but, rather, because I believe that this relatively recent switch in focus brings with it its own problems It is problematic for at least the following reasons: (1) given the nature of video game enactments (i.e., which necessarily involve make-believe), examining the worldview of video games seems to involve a degree of interpretation akin to those required for judgements of poor taste. I say this without seeking to promote any other approach to morality in particular

Endorsing the Immoral

The Case for Poor Taste

Concluding Remarks