Abstract

Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) monitor a network with the aim of discerning malicious from benign activity on that network. While a wide range of approaches have met varying levels of success, most IDS’s rely on having access to a database of known attack signatures which are written by security experts. Nowadays, in order to solve problems with false positive alerts, correlation algorithms are used to add additional structure to sequences of IDS alerts. However, such techniques are of no help in discovering novel attacks or variations of known attacks, something the human immune system (HIS) is capable of doing in its own specialised domain. This paper presents a novel immune algorithm for application to an intrusion detection problem. The goal is to discover packets containing novel variations of attacks covered by an existing signature base.

Highlights

  • Network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) are usually based on a fairly low level model of network traffic

  • Intrusion alert correlation systems attempt to solve this problem by postprocessing the alert stream from one or many intrusion detection sensors

  • The exact implementation details of attack graphs algorithms vary, the basic correlation algorithm takes an alert and an output graph, and modifies the graph by addition of vertices and/or edges to produce an updated output graph reflecting the current state of the monitored network system

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Summary

Introduction

Network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) are usually based on a fairly low level model of network traffic. The attack graph enables a correlation component to link a given alert with a previous alert by tracking back to find alerts whose consequences imply the current alerts prerequisites Another feature is that if the correlation algorithm is run in reverse, predictions of future attacks can be obtained. In implementing basic correlation algorithms using attack graphs, it was discovered that the output could be poor when the underlying IDS produced false negative alerts. This could cause scenarios to be split apart as evidence suggestive of a link between two scenarios is missing. Presence of hypothesised alerts could mean more than just losing an alert, it could mean either of: 1. The IDS missed the alert due to some noise, packet loss, or other low level sensor problem

The IDS missed the alert because a novel variation of a known attack was used
Intrusion Alert Correlation
Danger Theory
The Algorithm
Danger
Experimental Results
Conclusions and Future Work

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