Integrated reporting: The mediating role of the board of directors and investor protection on managerial discretion in munificent environments

Abstract

AbstractIs there a relationship between managerial discretion in munificent environments and the propensity to disclose an integrated reporting? Is this relationship contingent on the board of directors and investor protection? For an international sample for 2006–2014, this paper supports the assertion that managers are more able to extract superior perquisites when the level of accumulated cash holding is higher; that is, in munificent contexts. Because of the greater managerial discretion in these contexts, managers show a lower incentive to disclose voluntary information through an integrated report, which decreases the firm's transparency. Nonetheless, the board of directors and the level of investor protection, as control mechanisms, play an active role in constraining managerial discretion and improving the firm's transparency. The lower dissemination of integrated reporting in munificent contexts—where managerial discretion is greater—is moderated when the board is stronger and in countries with higher levels of investor protection.