Integrated reporting and earnings quality: The moderating effect of agency costs

Abstract

Prior studies have suggested a link between disclosure mechanisms and accounting information quality. They also report better quality information in the presence of higher transparency and clarity in disclosure mechanisms. We contend that voluntary integrated reporting (IR) as a disclosure mechanism has an incremental positive effect on accounting information and particularly the quality of reported earnings. Consistent with this argument, we find a positive relationship between voluntary adoption of IR practice and earnings quality. Furthermore, while voluntary adoption of IR is positively associated with earnings quality for firms experiencing high agency costs, the moderating effect of firm level agency costs have an insignificant effect on the relationship between voluntary IR practice and the level of integration. We find no evidence consistent with the proposition that managerial opportunism is relevant in shaping the effectiveness of IR practice for quality disclosure when a higher level of integration is achieved. Moreover, we find no evidence that firm complexity affects the relationship between IR practice and earnings quality. Overall, our findings are consistent with the view that IR wields an incremental positive effect on the quality of accounting information.