Integralność sędziego w orzekaniu i zachowaniu

Paweł Skuczyński

doi:10.7206/kp.2080-1084.472

Abstract

The article concerns judicial integrity in its basic meaning, i.e. as the consistency of actions with beliefs. Firstly, a reconstruction of the role of a judge’s beliefs was undertaken on the basis of the philosophy law, which allowed for proving that at least on the grounds of the so-called third path theory, they are treated as essential. However, acknowledging their role raises questions about the danger of instrumentalising law by the judge and of instrumentalising the judge by the law. Ronald Dworkin’s philosophy which extensively refers to the concept of integrity was interpreted as a solution to the issue. Then, it was noted that this approach is too narrow, as it limits the possibility of including the judge’s beliefs in adjudication only when they meet the requirements of so-called appropriateness tests, and are therefore already included in the content of the legal order in some way. Furthermore, integrity in this sense does not cover the judge’s behaviours besides decision-making, the status of which increasingly requires a theoretical explanation and normative classification. In consequence, it was stated that the concept of integrity is connected with paradoxes. In spite of that, an attempt was made to design a more systematic approach to judicial integrity in adjudication and behaviour, which would lead to proving that it is something that should be cared about, and consequently, its behaviour should be made the object of normative and institutional solutions. At the same time, the concept of integrity seems to have more heuristic power than normative one.

Highlights

The article concerns judicial integrity in its basic meaning, i.e. as the consistency of actions with beliefs
Że ujęcie to jest zbyt wąskie, ponieważ ogranicza ono możliwość uwzględnienia przekonań sędziego w orzekaniu tylko, gdy spełniają one tzw. próg odpowiedniości, a więc w jakiś sposób zawierają się już w treści porządku prawnego
It was noted that this approach is too narrow, as it limits the possibility of including the judge’s beliefs in adjudication only when they meet the requirements of so-called appropriateness tests, and are already included in the content of the legal order in some way

Summary

PAWEŁ SKUCZYŃSKI

The article concerns judicial integrity in its basic meaning, i.e. as the consistency of actions with beliefs. It was noted that this approach is too narrow, as it limits the possibility of including the judge’s beliefs in adjudication only when they meet the requirements of so-called appropriateness tests, and are already included in the content of the legal order in some way Integrity in this sense does not cover the judge’s behaviours besides decision-making, the status of which increasingly requires a theore tical explanation and normative classification. Czy dopuszczalne jest publiczne ujawnianie tych przekonań i manifestowanie ich w swoim zachowaniu podczas pełnienia służby sędziowskiej, np. Czy dopuszczalne jest publiczne ich ujawnianie i manifestowanie poza służbą, w szczególności poprzez udział w debacie publicznej? W szczególności podejmowano ją na gruncie tych teorii, które koncentrowały się na sądowym stosowaniu prawa. Nowością w obecnej refleksji jest poszukiwanie bardziej systematycznego podejścia, które mogłoby objąć całość tej problematyki i dzięki temu stanowić intelektualną podstawę spójnych rozwiązań instytucjonalnych.

Podmiotowość sędziego a zagrożenie podwójnej instrumentalizacji

Przekonania sędziego i integralność w ujęciu Ronalda Dworkina

Paradoksy pojęcia integralności

Możliwość podejścia systematycznego

Zdanie odrębne

Krytyka podejścia systematycznego