Insurgency in Northeast Thailand: A New Cause for Alarm

Abstract

WHILE THE GENESIS of active insurgency in Thailand dates back to the early 1950s, it was not until 1961 that the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) adopted a line of armed revolution. The revolutionary goal of this insurgency is the seizure of power from the Thai government through Maoist political and military techniques. Even though the Communists have realized some fragmentary successes in battle with the Royal Thai Government (RTG), they have not been able to attain their ultimate objective. Such factors as religion, nationalism, monarchial rule, and a homogeneous culture and language have been barriers to any long term success of insurgency, and explain why the communist appeals for revolution have not yet been capable of penetrating the deeply rooted traditional values of the Thai villagers. But these values are changing in such a manner that a social and economic gap may be detected between the once passive Thai villager and the Bangkok government. Additionally, the U.S. by virtue of its military presence in Southeast Asia has provided an aura of security for Thailand for more than 25 years. Now that the U.S. appears to have abandoned its allies in Southeast Asia, American credibility is being challenged not only by the Bangkok government, but by several other Asian nations. No longer does the umbrella of American military power pervade Thailand. With the presence of social, political and economic discontent in a country already experiencing ethnic tensions and communist pressures resulting from the Khmer Rouge victory in Cambodia and the North Vietnamese success in Vietnam, the insurgents may be able to readjust their appeals and create an atmosphere conducive to revolution. If this is the case, then the RTG will be confronted with a new cause for alarm.