Insurgency and Ivory: The Territorial Origins of Illicit Resource Extraction in Civil Conflicts

Felix Haass

doi:10.1177/0010414020957682

Abstract

The presence of natural resources makes civil conflicts more likely to erupt, last longer, and more difficult to end. Yet rebels do not always exploit resources wherever they are present. Why? I argue that rebels extract more resources when they compete with governments over territorial authority. Territorial competition facilitates black market access, generates financial pressure, and produces governance incentives for rebels to extract natural resources. I test this proposition in a two-tiered research design. First, I show globally that moderate territorial control predicts more resource extraction by rebels. Subsequently, I focus on the example of ivory poaching which offers a rare glimpse into the usually hidden resource extraction process. I match spatially disaggregated conflict event data to subnational poaching data in conflict-affected African countries. Results show that rebels seeking territorial control substantially increase poaching rates. These findings highlight the strategic conditions under which territorial competition shapes rebel criminal behavior.

Highlights

When do rebel groups extract natural resources during civil conflicts? An extensive literature links rebels’ exploitation of lootable natural resources to armed conflict
I test for the possibility that rebel territorial competition and poaching is jointly determined by (1) prior battle violence, (2) prior levels of poaching, (3) peace agreements, (4) peacekeeping deployments, (5) availability of other natural resources and resource profitability shocks; (6) droughts and rainfall shocks; (7) migration and IDP flows; (8) choice of unit of observation (MAUP problem), (9) two different types of reporting bias, (10) ACLED geocoding precision, or (11) sample choice
When do rebels extract natural resource in civil conflicts? I argue that rebels have strong incentives to extract natural resources when they are actively competing with a government over territorial authority

Summary

Introduction

When do rebel groups extract natural resources during civil conflicts? An extensive literature links rebels’ exploitation of lootable natural resources to armed conflict. It is when rebels actively compete with a government to establish political authority over territory that they intensify resource extraction.

Results

Conclusion