Insurgency and Democratisation: Taliban Real Winners of Elections in Afghanistan

Abstract

Promotion of democracy has been the cornerstone of the international community's efforts for peace-building in war-torn and post-conflict societies since the end of the Cold War. The issue gained further urgency in the aftermath of terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, when failed states were seen as breeding grounds for terrorism and sources of instability for world security. Afghanistan is one of the latest testing grounds for the democratic reconstruction model. The democratisation process was charted in December 2001 Bonn Agreement, and the latest presidential election was part of that process. This article analyses the internal and external implications of the 2009 presidential election in Afghanistan. It concludes that the election is a further proof of the failure of the democratic reconstruction model in war-torn societies. Emphasising form over substance and disregarding the political and cultural realities of the country, the international community hinged a lot of hope on the election. However, it was the Taliban who benefited from it. Militarily they demonstrated their potency vis-à-vis the NATO forces; and politically they reaped the benefits of the fallout of President Karzai's crisis of legitimacy, the risk of ethnic conflict, the UN's damaged credibility, and complications in the US counterinsurgency strategy.