Instrumentalism or Constitutivism: A Dilemma for Accounts of Transnational Political Authority

Abstract

This paper argues that discussions of transnational authority are hampered by an equivocation between two radically different kinds of authority, each possessing different normative logics. Instrumental authority, which treats political institutions as tools, is amenable to the disunited, pluralistic and highly contextualised nature of transnational governance. Furthermore, instrumental-transnational authority is compatible with the authority and sovereignty of states. Yet, instrumental authority is comparatively weak in terms of the political interventions it can justify. Constitutive authority, on the other hand, can justify much more intrusive and coercive political actions. Yet, I shall argue that only sovereign agents with unified legislative, judicial and executive powers can possess constitutive authority. I investigate different ways in which transnational institutions can be structured—from Slaughter's horizontal networks to Ruggie's substantive multilateralism—in order to illustrate a dilemma: transnational and global institutions can indeed possess authority, but it is of a kind that justifies a relatively narrow and weak set of political interventions.