Abstract
In the past decade or so, local governments in China have significantly increased their land development activities by acquiring land from farmers and leasing it on a large scale to industrial and commercial developers. This paper is an analysis of how land is used under China's existing institutional background as a competitive incentive for local investment. It is argued that local land development activities have contributed to an investment-driven growth in China that is not sustainable in the long run. On the basis of a panel data covering all provinces from 1998 to 2005, we empirically analyze the impacts of public land leasing on local fiscal revenue and gross domestic product (GDP). Policy implications are drawn with regard to further steps in land reforms.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
