Abstract
This paper considers the choice of regulatory instruments in a fishery. Fishing captains, consumers, and input suppliers each attempt to influence the regulator's choice of instruments. The regulator chooses among instruments such as input restrictions, entry restrictions, or individual transferable quotas (ITQs). Regulatory instruments that result in zero fishery rents can only occur if the regulator places an extraordinary weight on the welfare of input suppliers relative to fishing captains and consumers. Indeed, heterogeneity of fishing captains is neither necessary nor sufficient to obtain regulations that fail to generate fishery rents.
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