Abstract

The aim of this paper is to present an Institutional overview of the Romanian communal village form of property known as Obste and of the difference between “the old” and “the new” Obște. The Obste is the entity which manages the commons held by the villagers in a communal form of property. Usually, the commons managed by the Obste consist of forests, pastures and common infrastructure (markets, schools, ballrooms or even the public lighting system in some cases). The type of commons over which the Obste has a major impact is the forest, because the incentives to exploit it in order to increase the total revenue are much more pressing. The analysis will be based on the institutional analysis and development framework. The analysis will be cross-temporal in the sense that all the communal villages will be analyzed over three time periods: the old Obste (the period until 1948) –, the communist period (1948-1989, when all the communal properties were transferred to state’s property) and the new Obste (1990 – present; a significant moment in this third period was the enforcement of a new law in 2000, which opened the opportunity to re-establish the communal village’s Obste). The focus of the paper will be on the effects of the monitoring and sanctioning instruments in the three periods mentioned above and on how their changes affected the CPRs institutions' robustness levels.

Highlights

  • The aim of this paper is to present an Institutional overview of the monitoring and sanctioning instruments that existed in the Romanian communal villages

  • The Romanian communal villages are known as Obște

  • The analysis will be cross-temporal in the sense that all the communal villages will be analyzed over three time periods: the old Obste, the communist period (1948-1989, when all the communal properties were transferred to state’s property) and the new Obste (1990 – present; a significant moment in this third period was the enforcement of a new law in 2000, which opened the opportunity to re-establish the communal village’s Obste)

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Summary

Introduction

In this paper I employ the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework in order to offer an answer to the following research question: “do institutions matter in the management of commons?”. Starting from the Ostromian theoretical framework, every Common Pool Resource (CPR, hereafter), in order to avoid the tragedy of commons, has to be governed by eight design principles. From these eight design principles of the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework, I will analyze only the 4th and 5th: monitoring and graduated sanctioning. All the eight design principles are linked one to another and the framework works as a whole, for this analysis I start from the assumption that all the other principles (1-3 and 6-8) are satisfied In my opinion, this may look like a ceteris paribus assumption, that should be made in order to test or analyze only two principles. The aim of this paper is to map the sanctioning instruments and their related features for the case of three types of Romanian communal villages

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