Institutions or Power Sharing: Making Sense of Canadian Peace

Abstract

Why has Canada managed to avoid violent conflicts in its recent his tory? Jason Kaufman's institutionalist emphasis on the benevolent effects of federalism and group rights (and wealth) is well put. I wonder, how ever, if one can answer this question within the framework of a two-case comparison. There is a large comparative literature on war and peace. Much of this literature is written by political scientists and based on large N, cross-national research. I am surprised that a scholar of Kaufman's erudition and someone as well read across disciplines as he is, would not be aware of this decade-long research tradition. How does Kaufman's interpretation of the Canadian case compare to the more robust results that this tradition has produced? First, he is right in emphasizing wealth as a main factor in explaining peace?the most powerful explanatory variable in cross-national analysis of civil war besides population size. Why should this be the case? Perhaps we should look at the crucial moment (or potential critical juncture, if you prefer jargon) when Canadian history could have taken another turn: the mobili zation, inspired by the U.S. civil rights movement, of French Canadians during the 1960s against their status as second-class citizens. The Cana dian government reacted with a quite massive program to enhance the position of French speakers in the central administration, to massively increase support for French culture and language, and so forth. Put differ ently, it co-opted the educated middle classes most likely to support a rad ical nationalist cause?similar to the reaction of the U.S. government to the civil rights movement. Only rich governments have the capacity to co-opt social movements in this manner and to avoid further radicaliza tion and violence. But wealth is not enough: only where the ruling circles are willing to share power will such co-optation happen. The contrast