Institutions in cosmopolitan justice

Abstract

This paper focuses on a distinction between two kinds of theories about the role of institutions in cosmopolitan justice. Some philosophers claim that principles of egalitarian justice apply to institutional schemes only, and do not apply to the actions of individuals. Others think that principles of egalitarian justice apply also to the actions of individuals. The purpose of this article is to clarify this debate with a view on cosmopolitan justice by examining whether institutions can make a non-instrumental difference to what people ought to do with regard to distributive justice. The starting point is the outlining of two strategies arguing for the special significance of institutions in cosmopolitan justice. The first strategy demands the global application of principles of justice on the basis of regarding institutions as possible channels of collective harm. The second strategy argues that institutions enable a more effective discharging of individual duties that we have independently of participation in institutions. In contrast to these two strategies, the argument is made for regarding institutions as making a non-instrumental difference to what people ought to do with regard to cosmopolitan justice. The argument emphasising the constitutive role of global institutions in distributive justice is based on the conditional character of moral duties and on the systematicity of institutional schemes. The thesis is justified by reference to institutions' capacity to solve coordination problems and conflicts raised by the fact of disagreement, and their capacity to determine a unique set of just distributive rules, given the essentially underdetermined character of the demands of justice.