Abstract
Establishment of property rights over inland fisheries of Bangladesh has been able to internalize appropriation externalities. How- ever, the agents have failed to internalize provi- sion problems due to the physical characteristics of the resource systems. We have observed that the rules traditionally followed by the fishers are maintained and preserved by agents having ex- clusive property rights over the resource systems. The relationship between the agents and the fish- ers is not anonymous but of a patron-client type. Such outcome does not follow from the analysis of those who think that private property rights are the only solution to common-pool problems. (JEL Q22)
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