Institutionalizing a global anti-corruption regime: Perverse effects on country outcomes, 1984–2012

Abstract

A global anti-corruption movement rapidly mobilized and institutionalized during the mid-1990s. Using data for 119 countries between 1984 and 2012, I examine the effects of this movement on rated levels of perceived corruption. Results from multivariate regression analyses show that the global surge in anti-corruption organizing, monitoring, and legalization was paradoxically associated with an increase in rated levels of corruption, over and above a host of political, economic, social, and cultural factors shown in previous research to explain perceived corruption. With the international standardization, scrutinization, and stigmatization of corruption, activities once hidden from view or previously regarded as ‘standard operating procedure’ came to be denominated, detected, and decried as illegitimate. In turn, these processes gave the impression that corruption worsened, when in fact it may have remained stable or even improved. These findings lend support to institutional approaches in sociology and the ‘information paradox’ concept in political science.