Abstract
An endogenous model of constitutional changes and economic growth links the temporal decline in private market returns when technology is constant with the returns to rule changes realized in a political market. There is a steady state constitutional setting in which all rule changes have been incorporated that is analytically equivalent to the neoclassical steady state. As in the neoclassical model, private-sector technological progress postpones the steady state. To the extent the original constitutional setting promotes innovation, the evolutionary process toward the steady state is delayed. The model yields a theory of revolution based on forces leading to the adoption of inefficient changes in the constitutional setting.
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