Institutional resilience of Taiwan’s semi-presidential system: the integration of the president and premier under party politics

Abstract

ABSTRACTOver the past three decades, the semi-presidentialism has been adopted in most new democracies. It is also the constitutional order in most democracies, which can be divided into three categories: established, post-Leninist, and postcolonial democracies. Semi-presidentialism is a political system with dual executive branches. Moreover, because of these dual executive branches, the constitutional order of semi-presidentialism might be similar to a presidential system if the president is the de facto head of government. It might also be similar to a parliamentary system if the prime minister is the de facto head of government with the support of the parliamentary majority. Taiwan has been considered as a semi-presidential country since 1997. According to Taiwan’s constitutional amendments, its president is directly elected, and the premier (prime minister) and cabinet are responsible to the legislature. Dual executive system in Taiwan has been effective and flexible. I attempt to examine the institutional resilience of Taiwan’s constitutional function, which means that, in properly responding to social movements, its government has continued to function well. In addition, the president has been able to continue serving in office in spite of political crises. A vague constitutional design and a presidentialized party system are two reasons for this.