Abstract
Abstract This article applies and expands on a typology of organizational corruption control to analyze the various mechanisms used to address corruption within the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA). It uses case study evidence in tandem with insights from neo-institutional theory to construct a conceptual framework in which corruption control types are more completely examined within their broader institutional context. Using this framework, the article shows how the persistence of corruption in FIFA and its checkered reform process are attributable to an organizational filtering phenomenon that has limited the operation of internal and external corruption controls. Finally, it discusses some implications of this framework for transnational organizational governance reform.
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